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For many early-stage entrepreneurs, hiring the first employee is a critical step in the firm’s growth. Doing so
often requires significant time and monetary investments. To understand the trade-offs involved in deciding
when to hire the first employee and understand how hiring differs in entrepreneurial settings from more
established firm settings, we present a simple growth model that depends on two critical inputs for revenue
generation: the entrepreneur’s time and money. We show that without hiring, the entrepreneur’s time even-
tually becomes more valuable than money in contributing to the firm’s growth. In that context, the value of
the employee is driven by how much relief s/he provides to the entrepreneur. We characterize the optimal
timing of hiring in terms of the firm’s cash position and how it is affected if it requires an upfront fixed
investment in time and/or money. We find that an upfront investment in time needed for hiring cannot
be converted to an equivalent upfront investment in money and that mis-timing hiring can be very costly,
especially when these upfront investments are high.
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1. Introduction
Consider the following scenario typical in early-stage entrepreneurial firms. A company is founded
by a single individual. In the early days the entrepreneur is involved in all aspects of the com-
pany’s operations. However, as the company does well and grows, the number of tasks requiring
the entrepreneur’s time and attention multiplies, and it becomes increasingly difficult for the
entrepreneur to manage everything. At some point the entrepreneur needs to hire an employee to
delegate tasks and sustain the growth of the firm. This leads to a decision faced by most early-stage
entrepreneurs: When to hire that first employee?
Our focus is on “bootstrapping” entrepreneurs who have an operating business that they seek to
grow over a planning horizon by investing their own time and re-investing their earnings (Ebben and
Johnson 2006). Specifically, according to Mills’s (2015) classification of 28 million “small businesses”
in America, our context is the subset of 23 million “sole proprietorships” who plan to become either
one of the 4 million ”main street” businesses or one of the 1 million “suppliers.” Businesses that
1
Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
2 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-13-215.R2
already have a small number of employees but none who participate in managerial activities also
fit within our context. For instance, a contractor may have a few carpenters on the payroll but
is still essentially managing her firm single-handedly, just like a restaurateur who may have a few
waitstaff and line cooks but who still basically runs the restaurant by himself.
For our type of entrepreneur, hiring the very first managerial employee is a particularly important
decision because it requires, in addition to the ongoing salary payments, significant upfront time
and money investments. This is because working with an employee entails fundamental changes to
how the firm operates, e.g., the entrepreneur must set up an organizational structure and codify the
work processes and assign roles (Churchill and Lewis 1983, Gerber 2001, Burgstone and Murphy
2012, Hess 2012). However, it also frees up some of the entrepreneur’s time, which can then be
invested in continued growth. As such, hiring the first employee marks the transition from an
entrepreneur-dominated firm to a phase of rapid growth in the company’s life cycle (Hambrick and
Crozier 1985).
This paper has two goals: first, to provide insights into when that first hire should occur, and
second, to highlight how this decision is different for an entrepreneur than for an established firm.
To do so, we present a simple growth model of an entrepreneurial firm based on the assumptions
that (a) the entrepreneur’s time, in addition to money, is an important input for generating revenue
and growth (Le´vesque and MacCrimmon 1997), and (b) the firm is constrained in both time
(McCarthy et al. 1990, Gifford 1992) and money (Hambrick and Crozier 1985, Ebben and Johnson
2006). Hiring allows the entrepreneur to trade off one constrained resource (money) to gain another
constrained resource (time). This is different from a more established firm, where hiring is done by
an HR department or by others that are less directly linked to the revenue-generating activities of
the firm.
Within the context of that growth model, we formulate the decision of when to hire the first
employee as an optimal stopping problem, we characterize the optimal timing in terms of a cash
threshold, and analyze the sensitivity of that decision, both analytically and numerically. Our
analysis generates the following four take-aways, which have, in varying degrees, managerial impli-
cations for entrepreneurs and shed insights onto the differences between entrepreneurial and more
established firms.
First, we find that, without hiring, the entrepreneur’s time eventually becomes more valuable
than money in contributing to the firm’s growth. For entrepreneurs, this key observation implies
that their time is likely to become more valuable over time. That is, even if today an entrepreneur
may prefer $10,000 over 10 hours of time, there will come a time when the entrepreneur will prefer
the 10 hours. A direct implication of that result is that investing money and/or time today to save
time later is likely to be a good investment. In addition, this result suggests that an employee’s
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value increases over time in an entrepreneurial setting because the entrepreneur’s time constraint
becomes tighter as the firm grows, whereas it is more stable in established firms that operate in
stationary environments.
Second, we show that the optimal timing of hiring can be characterized in terms of the firm’s total
cash position. Moreover, the optimal timing of hiring can occur before or after the entrepreneur’s
time becomes the chief bottleneck of the firm, depending, among others, on the employee’s wage
and the amount of time relief the employee provides to the entrepreneur. As a result, entrepreneurs
should not necessarily wait with hiring until they feel that they have to hire, but they should
consider hiring as soon as they can afford to. In contrast, in established firms, the decision to hire
an additional employee is typically independent of the firm’s cash position.
Third, we find that the required upfront time investment and money investment associated with
hiring the first employee have different effects on the timing of hiring. When greater monetary
investment is required, the entrepreneur should delay hiring. In contrast, when greater time invest-
ment is required, it may be optimal to either expedite or delay hiring. The intuition behind this
non-monotone effect is as follows. On the one hand, more time (and money) diverted away from
revenue-generating activities impacts growth more severely earlier in the growth phase, making it
desirable to delay hiring. On the other hand, because the opportunity cost of time becomes more
valuable later, it is desirable to incur a larger time outlay earlier when time is less valuable. In
other words, upfront setup time and cost are not interchangeable in entrepreneurial firms. Hence,
if an entrepreneur realizes that she underestimated the monetary cost of hiring, she should delay
hiring relative to her original plan; but if she underestimated the time cost of hiring, she may have
to hire earlier rather than delaying. The different effect of hiring setup time and hiring setup cost
is specific to entrepreneurial settings. In more established firm settings, setup time and setup cost
are typically considered as interchangeable because a dedicated human resource function exists
to incur the upfront time required for hiring (e.g. screening, assigning roles, and training) on the
employer’s behalf (see e.g. Gans and Zhou 2002). And unlike the entrepreneur’s time, which has a
direct effect on the entrepreneurial firm’s growth, the time spent by that dedicated human resource
department has typically no direct impact on generating or fulfilling demand.
Fourth, we numerically observe that the timing of hiring is a significant factor in determining
the growth trajectory, especially when hiring entails large upfront investments. Whereas hiring too
soon is costly because growth is stunted more heavily, hiring too late is costly because of the missed
growth opportunity. Because the negative effects of mistimed hiring appear to be smaller when it
requires less upfront investments of time and money, entrepreneurs who, in practice, may not be
able to hire at the optimal time, should strive to reduce these hiring setup costs and time. For
instance, entrepreneurs could always be on the lookout for that first employee from the moment
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they start the firm, so that, when the time comes that they actually need to hire, their setup time
will be lower. Although mistiming hiring is costly in both entrepreneurial and established firms, the
effect may be more severe in entrepreneurial firms because it stunts growth in addition to deferring
future profits.
2. Literature Review
Our work builds on several streams of literature. In the human resource management literature,
Cardon and Stevens (2004) report a limited understanding of many important human resource
issues specific to entrepreneurial firms. Apart from a few descriptive studies that explore the
entrepreneur’s difficulty in hiring or their non-traditional recruitment practices (Aldrich and Fiol
1994, Williamson 2000, Collins and Clark 2003), the lack of formal theory is widely noted (Tansky
and Heneman 2006). Due to the advent of data analytics, the theory and practice of recruitment
by established firms are increasingly being guided by quantifying an employee’s financial value to
the firm. However, applying the same approach is difficult in the entrepreneurial context (Hay-
ton 2003). Taking an operations management perspective we derive a simple guideline for how an
employee should be valued based on the level of relief s/he provides to the entrepreneur’s time
constraint. To the best of our knowledge, such a formalization has not been made in this context.
Our paper relates to studies that recognize the importance of managing time as a key resource
for entrepreneurs, such as McCarthy et al. (1990), Cooper et al. (1997), Le´vesque et al. (2002),
Le´vesque and Schade (2005), Mueller et al. (2012), and Burmeister-Lamp et al. (2012)). This
literature argues that having more time available is beneficial for the venture’s success, but its
treatment of the cost of that time is usually limited to lost wages or reduced leisure time and it
does not consider how to increase the supply of time. In contrast, we formalize the evolving value
of time during the growth horizon and value when the entrepreneur should buy additional time.
Our model’s focus on time and money inputs shares some similarity to Le´vesque and MacCrim-
mon (1997), who examine how an entrepreneur should transition from being an employee in a wage
job to founding a new venture by diverting time and money from the former to the latter. They
examine how the work tolerance of the entrepreneur and the nature of the new venture determine
the optimal allocation of time between the two competing jobs over a planning horizon and explain
the empirically observed patterns in entrepreneurs’ shifting time allocation. In contrast, we focus
on full-time entrepreneurs who invest all of their available time in their business and who wish to
acquire more time by hiring. Our aim is to attain insights into when the first hiring should occur.
Managing the workforce has long been an important problem in operations management, from
the early literature on workforce planning (Holt et al. 1960, Orrbeck et al. 1968, Ebert 1976) to
more recent staffing in service systems (Pinker and Shumsky 2000, Gans and Zhou 2002, Arlotto
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et al. 2014). These hiring-related studies have traditionally focused on large firm settings with
exogenous demand. In these contexts, the hiring setup time is often used interchangeably with
setup costs (Gans and Zhou 2002). We contribute to the literature by concentrating on an early-
stage entrepreneurial firm, in which revenue and growth depend on how the entrepreneur manages
both time and money, and where hiring changes the growth trajectory of the firm. We show that,
in our context, hiring setup time and cost have a different effect on the timing of hiring.
The timing of hiring the first employee is analogous to the timing of irreversible decisions such
as investing in capacity (Luss 1982, Van Mieghem 2003) or adopting a new technology (Pindyck
1988, Dixit and Pindyck 1994, McDonald and Siegel 1986). Similar to these papers, we adopt an
optimal stopping problem framework to examine the decision. However, there are key differences in
the underlying trade-offs that we study. Unlike the capacity expansion setting where the decision
primarily concerns a fixed upfront investment of capital (or money), we examine a fixed invest-
ment of two complementary resources, namely the hiring setup cost and time, which influence the
availability of time and money in all future periods. Moreover, unlike the technology adoption set-
tings where the timing depends on learning and resolution of technological uncertainty, the timing
decision here depends mainly on increasing the value of time relative to money.
Finally, there is a growing literature on operations of entrepreneurial firms. The common goal of
this research is to identify strategies to improve the chance of success of newly formed companies.
For example, Archibald et al. (2002) show how to make conservative inventory decisions to maxi-
mize survival; Babich and Sobel (2004) examine how to maximize the expected value of payoff in
IPO; Swinney et al. (2011) study how to invest in capacity when competing against an established
firm; Tanrisever et al. (2012) examine how to invest in process improvement under the threat of
bankruptcy. Focusing specifically on the time allocation decision, Yoo et al. (2015) examine how
entrepreneurial firms should allocate their time to process improvement activities, while Huang
et al. (2015) examine how to allocate time to maximize short-term sales. Focusing on financing
challenges, Buzacott and Zhang (2004) examine how startups can leverage asset-based financing.
We contribute to this stream of research by focusing on the entrepreneur’s hiring decision.
3. A Model of Entrepreneurial Growth without Hiring
We first present a stylized model of revenue generation and growth of an entrepreneurial firm
that reinvests its earnings to fund its growth (Ebben and Johnson 2006). We consider two inputs,
time and money, which are frequently cited as the most important ones for entrepreneurial firms
(Le´vesque and MacCrimmon 1997) to show that, as the firm grows, its chief bottleneck shifts from
money to time. This model will serve as the basis for our subsequent analysis of when to hire the
first employee, in §4.
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3.1. Model and Notation
In each period t (e.g., two months) the entrepreneur has time (Tt) and money (Mt) available to
invest in the firm, which generate revenue R(Mt, Tt) for period t for simplicity. The revenue function
R(Mt, Tt) is assumed to be the same each period throughout the planning horizon N . Investments
Mt and Tt in period t may also have longer-lasting effects beyond period t. For instance, time and
money spent on advertising may also effect future sales, although this effect will decline over time
(Mahajan et al. 1984). We model this using exponentially decaying residual revenues γkR(Mt, Tt)
(0≤ γ < 1) in future periods t+ k, ∀k ≥ 0 as a result of period t’s investments. If γ = 0, then the
effects of investments accrue only in the current period.
We assume that more resources invested in the firm leads to greater revenue, and that money
exhibits diminishing returns. That is, R(Mt, Tt) is increasing in (Mt, Tt) and concave in Mt; how-
ever, R(Mt, Tt) need not be concave in Tt. We further assume that investing more money in the
business can never generate less revenue (e.g. because the additional money can be put aside in
the firm’s account), i.e. ∂R(M,T )
∂M
≥ 1. Time and money are complementary so the marginal return
on investment in one is increasing in the investment in the other, i.e., R(Mt, Tt) has increasing
differences in (Mt, Tt). Finally, R(0, T ) ≥ 0 ∀T ≥ 0. (Throughout the paper, we use the terms
increasing/decreasing in a weak sense, i.e., as nondecreasing/nonincreasing.)
Without hiring, the entrepreneur’s time supply remains fixed (∀t, Tt = T ), all of which is invested
into the venture. We ignore learning effects that may influence the entrepreneur’s productivity.
Accordingly we drop the subscript and refer to T throughout.
The firm’s cash level is exposed to additive random shocks, which can impact future periods.
This can result from fire-fighting, for example, giving unhappy customers rebate in future dealings
to limit negative publicity, or having to pay premiums to expedite shipments in the future to
make up for delays. We use additive shocks because businesses are typically less vulnerable to risk,
relative to their size, as they grow, see e.g., Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989).
We model the stochastic shocks by a Markov process {Zt}, where Zt+1 = φ(Zt, ζt), in which {ζt}
are independently distributed random variables with finite support. In particular, one can define
Zt+1 = ρZt + (1 − ρ)ζt, in which {ζt} are independent and identically distributed (iid); in that
case {Zt} is a stationary sequence of correlated shocks. Our model can also capture cumulative
shocks, when Zt+1 = ρZt+ ζt and {ζt} are iid. If ρ> 0 (ρ< 0), the next period’s random shock Zt+1
is positively (negatively) correlated with the shock experienced in the current period (Zt) and a
random component (ζt). If ρ= 0, we have state-independent random shocks φ(Zt, ζt) = ζt.
If the entrepreneur starts in period 1 with a cash level M1 and shock state Z1, the firm’s cash
position at the end of period t, Mt+1, is equal to
Mt+1 = R(Mt, T )+
t−1∑
s=1
γt−sR(Ms, T )−φ(Zt, ζt). (1)
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The presence of stochastic shocks allows the sequence {Mt} to decrease, and it is in principle
possible for the firm to lose all its money during the horizon. Given our focus on growth-oriented
firms, we are interested in cases where Mt remains positive throughout the planning horizon N ;
that is, despite the stochastic shocks, enough revenue R(M,T ) is generated each period to maintain
a positive cash level over the length of the planning horizon N . For mathematical completeness,
we consider the extended value extension of R(M,T ) in our analysis, i.e., R(M,T ) =−∞ if M < 0
(Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004), to ensure that the entrepreneur’s hiring decisions do not lead to
a negative cash position.
As is common in the entrepreneurial OM literature, we assume risk neutrality (Archibald et al.
2002, Buzacott and Zhang 2004, Tanrisever et al. 2012). We consider the objective of maximizing
the firm’s cash position at the end of a planning horizon of N periods (e.g., a couple of years), i.e.,
maximizing MN . This objective (after subtracting initial cash) represents the total earnings over
the planning horizon, which is a common goal for early-stage startups (Gerber 2001, Burgstone and
Murphy 2012). Moreover, because R(M,T ) is increasing in M and cash accumulation (1) increases
in R(Mt, T ) for all t, any alternative objective that is an increasing transformation of MN (e.g.
maximize the revenue R(M,T ) at period t=N) would lead to same insights.
3.2. Bottleneck Shift
Given our time- and money-dependent growth model, we next present how the firm’s bottleneck
shifts from money to time over a given planning horizon. The following result shows a fundamental
characteristic of early-stage bootstrapping entrepreneurial firms, experiencing deterministic growth,
i.e., when Zt = 0 ∀t. (Later, we relax the monotone growth assumption.)
Proposition 1. Let µt =
∂MN
∂Mt
and τt =
∂MN
∂Tt
denote the effect on period-N cash position of an
investment of money and time in period t when Zt = 0,∀t. Then, µt/τt decreases in t and there
exists at most one time period tˆ at which the entrepreneur’s bottleneck switches from money to
time, i.e., τt >µt if and only if t≥ tˆ.
Proposition 1 shows a simple but fundamental consequence of growth in the entrepreneurial firms
we consider: an incremental unit of the entrepreneur’s time will eventually become more valuable
than an incremental unit of money. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where the bottleneck shift
occurs in period t= 5. (To help illustrate our results, we use a running example throughout the
paper, which is introduced formally in Section 5. The parameters of that example appear in the
note in Figure 1.) Hiring can be seen as a mechanism for trading money for additional time, and
Proposition 1 shows that this trade-off becomes more attractive in later periods.
Suppose an employee can bring y additional units of time and costs a wage w each period.
(Here, y is expressed in equivalent units of the entrepreneur’s time. For instance, an employee
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Figure 1 Evolution of shadow prices as the firm grows over time. The entrepreneur’s time eventually replaces
money as the chief bottleneck of the firm.
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Note. Parameters: R(M,T ) = 1.2M0.9T 0.4, γ = 0.1, M1 = 1, T = 2, Zt = 0 ∀t.
who is 75% as productive as the entrepreneur and works the same total number of hours T would
contribute y = 0.75T units of time to the firm.) Then, after hiring, the total available time per
period increases from T to T + y, whereas the available money Mt decreases by w, in all future
periods t. This employee, although not necessarily valuable early on, may become increasingly
valuable for the entrepreneur as the firm grows. In contrast, in established firms that operate in
stationary environments, the value of an employee remains stable over time.
The next corollary characterizes how the shadow prices of money and time relate to when the
entrepreneur should hire a “marginal” employee, meaning an employee who adds marginal time y
for marginal wage w.
Corollary 1. Consider a potential employee who costs w and contributes y each period after
being hired. When Zt = 0 ∀t, as w ↓ 0 and y ↓ 0, it is optimal to hire the employee in period t if and
only if y · τt >w ·µt.
The corollary implies that the optimal timing of hiring can occur before or after the
entrepreneur’s time becomes the chief bottleneck of the firm. For example, when the time relief
(y) provided by the employee is sufficiently high relative to the employee’s wage (w), hiring can be
optimal before the entrepreneur’s time becomes the chief bottleneck of the firm (i.e. when τt <µt).
The corollary can further be applied to approximate the wage the entrepreneur would be willing
to pay for an employee contributing y units of time from period t onwards. To illustrate this, let
us consider a Cobb-Douglas revenue function, i.e., R(M,T ) = κMαT β with 0< α < 1, κ > 0 and
β > 0. The Cobb-Douglas revenue function allows us to represent different types of businesses. For
example, having β ≈ 1 is similar to someone billing for time, while having β≪ 1 might be more
a fixed-cost business where an additional hour of the entrepreneur’s time is less valuable than the
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first hour. Similarly, having α ≈ 1 might involve the entrepreneur buying and selling inventory,
while having α≪ 1 might correspond to the entrepreneur investing in advertising but not buying
goods for resale. With this Cobb-Douglas revenue function, the ratio of shadow prices µt/τt turns
out to simplify to αT/(βMt) (see the proof of Proposition 1 for details), and by Corollary 1, for
sufficiently small w and y, the entrepreneur should hire the employee if
w ≤
(
β
α
)(
Mt
T
)
y.
Hence, an employee’s value increases if s/he is more available and/or more productive (greater y),
if the firm has more money (greaterMt) or less time (smaller T ), or if the revenue is more elastic to
time than money (greater β/α). Although our model is too stylized for this result to offer a precise
quantitative rule for entrepreneurs to use in practice, it highlights that the value of an employee
should be put in the context of the type of business (α,β) and the growth stage (Mt) of the firm.
This section considered how the bottleneck shifts under monotone growth and no hiring. We
next analyze a more general case with hiring that requires upfront investments, and examine how
the interplay between time and money influences the optimal timing of hiring.
4. Hiring the First Employee
In practice, hiring the first employee requires significant upfront investment of time and money
because the entrepreneur needs to create a structure for the organization, such as codifying the
work processes and assigning roles to accommodate this and subsequent employees. Thus, hiring
may require the entrepreneur to divert resources away from revenue-generating activities, which
may involve a temporary slowdown in revenue generation. To formalize these required upfront
investments, we assume that a setup cost SM and a setup time ST must be incurred in the hiring
period, just before the employee joins. Hence, the available cash in the hiring period decreases to
Mt − SM and the available time decreases to T − ST . We assume ST such that T − ST ≥ 0. The
employee, once hired, contributes y units of additional time and costs a wage w in all periods after
being hired.
We examine when the entrepreneur should hire the first employee in this more general setting
by using an optimal stopping time analysis. We first introduce the model (§4.1), characterize the
solution via a threshold rule (§4.2), and examine the comparative statics with respect to the upfront
time and money investment required in hiring the first employee (§4.3).
4.1. Optimal Stopping Time Framework
Because hiring creates different flows of cash and time, the cash transition in (1) needs to be
modified. Specifically, the cash transitions during and after hiring account for the hiring setup cost
and time (SM and ST ) and the employee’s time contribution and wage (y and w) respectively.
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The following lemma characterizes the cash transitions before, during, and after hiring, and the
sequence of events is shown in Figure 2.
Lemma 1. In period t > 1, for state (Mt,Zt, ζt), the cash available in period t + 1 when no
employee has been hired (f(Mt,Zt, ζt)), when an employee is being hired (g(Mt,Zt, ζt)), or when
an employee has been hired in a previous period (h(Mt,Zt, ζt)), are given by respectively:
f(Mt,Zt, ζt) , f¯(Mt)−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt , [γMt+R(Mt, T )]−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt,
g(Mt,Zt, ζt) , g¯(Mt)−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt , [γMt+R(Mt−SM , T −ST )]−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt, (2)
h(Mt,Zt, ζt) , h¯(Mt)−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt , [γMt+R(Mt−w,T + y)]−φ(Zt, ζt)+ γZt.
Figure 2 Sequence of events.
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Note that h(Mt,Zt, ζt) − f(Mt,Zt, ζt) = h¯(Mt) − f¯(Mt) is independent of ζt and Zt, and it is
increasing in Mt since R(Mt, T ) is concave in Mt and has increasing differences. In other words,
having hired becomes more attractive as the firm’s cash position increases. Throughout, we assume
the following on the hiring setup cost and time.
Assumption 1. (SM , ST ) are such that R(Mt, T )−R(Mt−SM , T −ST ) is decreasing in Mt.
The assumption states that the loss of revenue in the hiring setup period due to the diversion of
resources, i.e. R(Mt, T )−R(Mt−SM , T −ST ), will be smaller when the firm has more cash on hand
at the beginning of that period (Mt). In particular when ST = 0, this condition is automatically
satisfied since R(M,T ) is concave in M .
Denoting whether or not an employee has been hired by a binary state variable Et (Et = 1 if an
employee has been hired in or before period t, and Et = 0 if not), we have the following optimal
stopping problem.
Vt(0,Mt,Zt) = max
{
EζtVt+1(0, f(Mt,Zt, ζt), φ(Zt, ζt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
NotHire
, EζtVt+1(1, g(Mt,Zt, ζt), φ(Zt, ζt))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hire
}
, 1< t<N,
Vt(1,Mt,Zt) = EζtVt+1(1, h(Mt,Zt, ζt), φ(Zt, ζt)), t <N, (3)
V1(0,M1,Z1) = Eζ1V2(0,R(M1, T )−φ(Z1, ζ1), φ(Z1, ζ1)),
VN(·,MN ,ZN) = MN .
In the next section, we examine the optimal timing of hiring.
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4.2. Optimal Threshold Policy
We characterize the optimal hiring time in terms of a cash threshold. The threshold may, for
example, correspond to the slack in capital or the number of months of employee’s salary the firm
must have before hiring. An increase in the threshold corresponds to, all else being equal, a delay
in the timing of hiring because the firm must accumulate a higher cash level. We first establish a
lower bound on this optimal cash threshold.
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If Mt ≤M
lb(Zt) , max{M | g¯(f(Mt,Zt, ζt)) ≥
h¯(g(Mt,Zt, ζt)),∀ζt}, then it is optimal not to hire in period t.
The proposition identifies a lower bound on the threshold below which the entrepreneur should
never hire. The lower bound is constructed by comparing hiring in the current period (t) and in
the following period (t+ 1). The lower bound is useful because it denotes a necessary condition
for hiring; that is, if the entrepreneur has less cash than M lb(Zt), then s/he should not hire. The
following corollary shows that this lower bound may correspond to the optimal threshold under
specific circumstances.
Corollary 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If (i) Zt = 0 ∀t, and (ii) hiring must occur
before the end of the planning horizon (e.g., by modifying the boundary condition in (3) so that
VN(0, f(M),Z) < VN(1, g(M),Z) ∀M), then it is optimal to hire in period t if and only if Mt ≥
M lb(Zt), for any t≤N − 2.
In general, however, the lower bound need not be tight under stochastic growth. If we assume
that R(M,T ) is affine inM , the optimal hiring timing can be expressed in terms of a cash threshold.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that R(M,T ) = a(T ) + b(T )M , with
a(T ), b′(T )≥ 0, and b(T )≥ 1. Then,
(i) there exists a unique cash threshold M∗t (Zt) such that it is optimal to hire in period t if and
only if Mt ≥M
∗
t (Zt).
(ii) If φ(Zt, ζt) = ρZt+ ζt, with {ζt} independent, M
∗
t (Zt) is increasing in Zt if and only if ρ≥ γ.
The first part of Proposition 3 translates to a clear prescription on the timing of hiring: the
entrepreneur should hire as soon as M∗t (Zt) units of money are available and not hire otherwise.
The second part of Proposition 3 confirms the intuition that entrepreneurs should be more cautious
and delay hiring when they expect greater cash drains in the future, i.e., when Zt is larger.
The proof of Proposition 3 consists of analyzing the value functions in (3), which involve the
composition of functions and are difficult to analyze for nonlinear revenue functions. Although the
proof that a unique necessary and sufficient cash threshold exists requires that R(M,T ) is affine
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Figure 3 Lower bound M lb(Zt) and optimal hiring thresholds M
∗
t (Zt) for t = 1 and t = 7 as a function of Zt,
under larger (left) and smaller (right) shocks.
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Note. R(M,T ) = 1.2M0.9T 0.4, γ = 0.1, T = 2, (w,y) = (0.5,1.5), (SM , ST ) = (12,0.2). In the left panel, φ(Zt, ζt) =
Zt+ ζt, where ζt = 0± 0.5 with equal probability ∀t. In the right panel, ζt = 0± 0.05 with equal probability ∀t.
in M , we have not observed any case with multiple cash thresholds in our extensive numerical
analysis with more general revenue functions.
Building on the numerical example first shown in Figure 1, Figure 3 depicts the hiring cash
threshold when the linearity assumption is relaxed. In this case, we found that the hiring thresholds
were unique. The dotted curves in both panels indicate the lower bounds M lb(Zt) characterized in
Proposition 2, and the solid and dash-dot curves indicate the optimal hiring thresholds M∗t (Zt) in
periods t= 1 and t= 7 respectively. All thresholds are plotted as a function of Zt (i.e., Z1 or Z7)
and appear to be increasing in Zt, consistent with Proposition 3(ii).
The left panel shows that the lower bound M lb(Zt) and the optimal hiring threshold M
∗
t (Zt)
are in general far apart, and that the optimal hiring threshold in period t= 7 is greater than in
t= 1, i.e., M∗7 (Zt)≥M
∗
1 (Zt). This is because with less periods to go in the planning horizon, the
long-term benefits of hiring are less likely to justify the upfront costs. Comparing the right panel to
the left panel shows that when the shock process {ζt} approaches a deterministic and nonincreasing
sequence, the gaps between M∗t (Zt) and M
lb(Zt) shrink towards zero for early periods (e.g., t= 1),
consistent with Corollary 2. This suggests that more volatile stochastic shocks may also contribute
to delays in the optimal timing of hiring.
4.3. Sensitivity to Upfront Investment of Money and Time (SM , ST )
We next examine how the hiring decision is influenced by the required investment of money (SM)
and time (ST ) associated with hiring. An increase in either SM or ST means that the entrepreneur
must use more resources for hiring, which would otherwise be used to generate revenue. Since an
increase in either cash or time investment decreases the revenue in the hiring setup period and
Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
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Figure 4 Optimal hiring thresholds with respect to SM and ST .
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Note. R(M,T ) = 1.2M0.9T 0.4, γ = 0.1, T = 2, (w,y) = (0.5,1.5). Left panel: ST = 0.2, Right panel: SM = 35, Zt = 0
∀t.
temporarily stunts the growth trajectory, it may seem intuitive at first that it would lead to a delay
of hiring. However, we show next that the effect is more nuanced.
Proposition 4. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, and that {ζt} is deterministic ∀t. Then, if there
exists a unique hiring threshold M∗t (SM , ST ),
(i) M∗t (SM , ST ) is increasing in SM ,
(ii) M∗t (SM , ST ) need not be monotone in ST .
Proposition 4 highlights that the effects of hiring setup cost (SM) and setup time (ST ) are in
general different in an entrepreneurial setting. This difference is illustrated in Figure 4, which
continues the numerical example from Figures 1 and 3. As expected, if the monetary investment
required for hiring SM increases (left panel), it is optimal to postpone the resource drain to a
period where money is less critical, i.e., delaying hiring is optimal. By contrast, the effect of an
increase in ST need not be monotone (right panel). Two opposing effects are at play. Suppose that
the time investment required for hiring ST increases. On the one hand, delaying hiring would be
desirable to postpone the resource drain and preserve the growth trajectory. On the other hand,
the opportunity cost of time increases during the planning horizon (see Proposition 1), so the
entrepreneur would prefer to hire earlier in order to incur the increased time investment (ST ) earlier
when the value of time is lower.
In classical staffing models of large firms, no distinction is made between time and money invest-
ments associated with hiring, and the investment of time is often converted to costs (Gans and
Zhou 2002). In an established firm, the upfront time investment is typically bore by a dedicated
human resource department that typically has no direct impact on generating or fulfilling demand.
In such setting, if hiring takes twice as long as expected, it doesn’t have a direct effect on output,
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while for the entrepreneur it takes away that much productive time from the entrepreneur, so it
does have a direct effect on output. If hiring required primarily monetary investment, then an
increase in that cost would mean the entrepreneur should delay hiring. If, on the other hand, the
investment is primarily of time, then it may be that, the greater that time investment, the ear-
lier the entrepreneur should hire. Proposition 4 thus underscores the importance of distinguishing
between time and money investments in early-stage growth-oriented entrepreneurial firms, due to
the different paths of the shadow prices of time and money.
5. Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we complement the analysis of the previous section and numerically visualize the
effect of hiring on the firm’s growth (§5.1) and explore the sensitivity of the exact timing of hiring
(§5.2).
Throughout this section, we consider a Cobb-Douglas revenue function, R(M,T ) = κMαT β,
with κ = 1.2, α = 0.9, and β = 0.4, which satisfy the assumptions of the revenue function. (We
obtain similar insights for other parameter values.) The relatively high α and low β indicates
that additional money available brings a greater increase in revenue than additional time. We
assume that γ = 0.1, i.e., that 10% of the revenue generated today will recur next period. This
may represent a business that involves the entrepreneur buying and selling inventory to consumers,
some of whom become repeat customers. We set the entrepreneur’s available time each period as
T = 2 (representing two months/period), and consider a planning horizon of N = 12 (two years).
For the stochastic shock process {ζt}, we assume that φ(Zt, ζt) =Zt+ζt, where ζt are independent
and identically distributed with the following 2-point distribution: ζt = d+ σ or d− σ with equal
probability for all t, with d the drift and σ the volatility. A positive drift d > 0 implies that {Zt}
will increase in t on average. All code is written in Matlab and is available from the authors upon
request.
5.1. Effect of Hiring on the Firm’s Growth
We illustrate the behavior of the optimal timing of hiring when the employee terms are (w,y) =
(0.5,1.5), and the required upfront investments associated with hiring are (SM , ST ) = (6,0.1). Iden-
tical to Figure 1, we assume Zt = 0 ∀t, i.e., (d,σ) = (0,0).
The left panel of Figure 5 shows a sample evolution of the cash position with and without hiring
(solid curve and dotted curve respectively) starting from M1 = 1. Examining the growth trajectory
without hiring (dotted curve), we observe that the cash position accelerates approximately at a
constant rate throughout. Examining the growth trajectory with hiring (solid curve), we observe
that hiring optimally takes place in period t= 7. During this period, the entrepreneur’s time and
money are diverted from revenue-generating activities, and as a result, the cash positions for several
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Figure 5 Effect of Hiring: Evolution of firm’s cash position (Mt) and shadow prices of money and time (µt, τt).
        	 
 



















%






&%'
%%'
        	 
 
























 







Note. R(M,T ) = 1.2M0.9T 0.4, γ = 0.1, M1 = 1, T = 2, (w,y) = (0.5,1.5), (SM , ST ) = (6,0.1), Zt = 0 ∀t.
periods following hiring is less than what it would be without hiring. However, because additional
time is available with hiring, growth is accelerated and the firm eventually reaches a higher cash
position MN than without hiring.
The right panel of Figure 5 illustrates the corresponding evolution of the shadow prices when
hiring occurs. In contrast to Figure 1, when the shadow price of time continues to increase through-
out the planning horizon without hiring (Proposition 1), we observe a marked decrease in the
shadow price of time (and a slight increase in that of money) in period t= 7 and t= 8 after hiring
occurs. This is because hiring makes more time and less money available to the firm. After hiring,
extra time again continues to become more valuable while extra money continues to become less
valuable, suggesting the need for more hiring in the future.
5.2. Sensitivity of the Timing of Hiring
In this section, we examine the consequences of sub-optimal timing of hiring. We determine the ǫ%-
deviation from the optimal thresholds M∗t (Zt) – i.e., (1+ ǫ)M
∗
t (Zt) – and examine the percentage
loss of optimality (V
opt
−V sim
V opt
) based on the average of 5,000 simulation runs, where V opt denotes
the computed optimal value and V sim the simulation average based on applying the suboptimal
hiring threshold policy.
When the ǫ%-deviation is negative, it indicates that hiring occurs too early, which is costly
because it stunts the growth trajectory. When it is positive, it indicates that hiring takes place too
late, which is costly because of missed opportunity in growth. Figure 6 illustrates the percentage loss
of optimality when the hiring cash thresholds deviate from the optimal cash thresholds for varying
levels of upfront cost SM and time ST , while keeping constant w= 0.5, y= 1.5, and (d,σ) = (0,0.5).
The curves show that timing of hiring can have a significant effect on the firm’s growth objective,
and that it depends on the setup costs and time. Hiring too early or too late can cause significant
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Figure 6 Loss of optimality due to hiring below or above the optimal cash threshold.
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Note. R(M,T ) = 1.2M0.9T 0.4, γ = 0.1, T = 2, w= .5, y= 1.5, and M1 = 20, Z1 = 0, (d,σ) = (0,0.5).
loss in optimality. The percentage loss in optimality is smaller when the setup cost and time are
relatively low as indicated by the dashed curve ((SM , ST ) = (15,0.2)) than when they are relatively
high as indicated by the dotted curve ((SM , ST ) = (30,1.5)). In the dashed curve, a drop in the
optimal threshold by 30% leads to a 5%-loss in expected profit compared to the optimal; in the
dotted curve, a drop of 15%, leads to a 20%-loss in the expected profit compared to the optimal.
This suggests that when hiring requires significant upfront costs, mis-timing of hiring causes greater
damage to the firm’s growth compared to when it does not. This implies that for entrepreneurs,
reducing the hiring setup time and cost (e.g., through process improvement) could lessen the
negative effect of mistimed hiring.
We have focused our attention to the growth context and so limited our study to settings where
firms do not run out of cash during the horizon (i.e., do not go bankrupt). In a separate numerical
study, we have examined the effect of bankruptcy on the hiring decision. We found, as expected,
that hiring too early can increase the probability of bankruptcy while hiring too late has little
effect on further reducing that probability relative to the optimal hiring period. Therefore, when
bankruptcy is a concern, erring on the side of hiring late would be more desirable than erring on
the side of hiring too early.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an early-stage entrepreneur who is seeking growth by bootstrapping.
We characterize when to hire the first employee, and assess how this decision is different than it
would be in an established firm. To examine this, we analyze a stylized growth model for an early-
stage entrepreneurial firm based on the assumptions that two inputs, namely, time and money, are
required to generate revenue, and that both are limited. We conceptualize hiring as a time-money
tradeoff; in particular, hiring can accelerate growth by trading away less valuable money to gain
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more valuable time, but timing is crucial. Within that growth model, we characterize the optimal
timing of hiring as an optimal stopping rule in terms of the firm’s cash position and analyze the
sensitivity of that decision to the hiring setup time and setup costs.
Our results lead to several managerial implications for entrepreneurs. First, entrepreneurs should
realize that their time will become more valuable as their firm grows and, as a result, that early
investments to save time in the future are worth considering. Second, entrepreneurs should not
necessarily wait with hiring until they feel that they have to hire, but they should consider hiring as
soon as they can afford to. Third, if an entrepreneur realizes that she underestimated the monetary
cost of hiring, she should delay hiring relative to her original plan; but if she underestimated the
time cost of hiring, she may have to hire earlier rather than delaying. Fourth, entrepreneurs who
may not be able to hire at the optimal time, should strive to reduce the hiring setup costs and time,
e.g., by being on the lookout for that first employee from the moment they start the firm. Overall,
our conceptual framework can help entrepreneurs determine the value and the timing of hiring an
employee in terms of the associated time savings. For example, entrepreneurs can examine more
closely their own time usage, and also assess the potential employees based on the time savings
they provide.
Our results also highlight some key differences between entrepreneurial settings and more estab-
lished firm settings, as far as the hiring decision is concerned. First, an employee’s value increases
over time in an entrepreneurial setting because the entrepreneur’s time constraint becomes tighter
as the firm grows, whereas it is more stable in established firms. Second, the timing of hiring
depends on the firm’s cash position in an entrepreneurial setting, whereas it is typically indepen-
dent of the firm’s cash position in a more established firm. Third, the optimal timing of hiring
is influenced differently by the required upfront monetary investment and time investment during
the hiring setup period, in contrast to more established firms, where hiring setup time and hiring
setup costs are typically interchangeable. Fourth, the cost of mistiming hiring is more severe in
entrepreneurial firms than in established firms because if stunts their growth in addition to defer-
ring future profits. As we have shown, operations management insights that stem from large firms
may not be relevant to the entrepreneurial setting. Our work considers only a subset of different
types of entrepreneurial settings and exogenous uncertainties, and we hope that our work will
stimulate further research on other important operational questions for entrepreneurs.
References
Aldrich, H.E., C.M. Fiol. 1994. Fools rush in? The institutional context of industry creation. Acad. Manage-
ment Rev. 19(4) 645–670.
Archibald, T.W., L.C. Thomas, J.M. Betts, R.B. Johnston. 2002. Should start-up companies be cautious?
Inventory policies which maximize survival probabilities. Management Sci. 48(9) 1161–1174.
Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
18 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-13-215.R2
Arlotto, A., S.E. Chick, N. Gans. 2014. Optimal hiring and retention policies for heterogeneous workers who
learn. Management Sci. 60(1) 110–129.
Babich, V., M.J. Sobel. 2004. Pre-IPO operational and financial decisions. Management Sci. 50(7) 935–948.
Boyd, S., L. Vandenberghe. 2004. Convex Optimization. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Burgstone, J. and Murphy Jr, B. 2012. Breakthrough Entrepreneurship. Farallon Publishing. San Francisco,
CA.
Burmeister-Lamp, K., M. Le´vesque, C. Schade. 2012. Are entrepreneurs influenced by risk attitude, regula-
tory focus or both? An experiment on entrepreneurs’ time allocation. J. Bus. Venturing 27(4) 456–476.
Buzacott, J.A., R.Q. Zhang. 2004. Inventory management with asset-based financing.Management Sci. 50(9)
1274–1292.
Cardon, M.S., C.E. Stevens. 2004. Managing human resources in small organizations: What do we know?
Human Resource Management Rev. 14(3) 295–323.
Churchill, N.C., V.L. Lewis. 1983. The five stages of small business growth. Harvard Bus. Rev., May–June,
1983.
Collins, C.J., K.D. Clark. 2003. Strategic human resource practices, top management team social networks,
and firm performance: The role of human resource practices in creating organizational competitive
advantage. Acad. Management J. 46(6) 740–751.
Cooper, A., M. Ramachandran, D. Schoorman. 1997. Time allocation patterns of craftsmen and administra-
tive entrepreneurs: Implications for financial performance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Prac. 22(2)
123–136.
Dixit, A.K., R.S. Pindyck. 1994. Investment Under Uncertainty. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
Ebben, J., A. Johnson. 2006. Bootstrapping in small firms: An empirical analysis of change over time. J.
Bus. Venturing 21(6) 851–865.
Ebert, R.J. 1976. Aggregate planning with learning curve productivity. Management Sci. 23(2) 171–182.
Gans, N., Y. Zhou. 2002. Managing learning and turnover in employee staffing. Oper. Res. 50(6) 991–1006.
Gerber, M.E. 2001. The E-Myth Revisited: Why Most Small Business Don’t Work and What to Do About
It, HarperCollins Publishers, New York, NY.
Gifford, S. 1992. Allocation of entrepreneurial attention. J. Econom. Beh. Org. 19(3) 256–284.
Hambrick, D.C., L.M. Crozier. 1985. Stumblers and stars in the management of rapid growth. J. Bus.
Venturing 1(1) 31–45.
Hayton, J.C. 2003. Strategic human capital management in SMEs: An empirical study of entrepreneurial
performance. Human Resource Management 42(4) 375–391.
Hess, E.D. 2012. Grow to Greatness. Stanford University Press. Stanford, CA.
Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-13-215.R2 19
Holt, C.C., F. Modigliani, J. Muth, H.A. Simon. 1960. Planning Production, Inventory and Work Force.
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs. NJ.
Huang, Y., O.S. Yoo, B. Gokpinar. 2015. Time allocation in entrepreneurial selling: The role of customer
learning externality and incumbent reaction. Working Paper.
Le´vesque, M. 2004. Mathematics, theory, and entrepreneurship. J. Bus. Venturing 19(5) 743–765.
Le´vesque, M., D.A. Shepherd, E.J. Douglas. 2002. Employment or self-employment A dynamic utility-
maximizing model. J. Bus. Venturing 17(3) 189–210.
Le´vesque, M., K. MacCrimmon. 1997. On the interaction of time and money invested in new ventures.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Prac. 22(2) 89–110.
Le´vesque, M., C. Schade. 2005. Intuitive optimizing: Experimental findings on time allocation decisions with
newly formed ventures. J. Bus. Venturing 20(3) 313–342.
Luss, H. 1982. Operations research and capacity expansion problems: A survey. Oper. Res. 30(5) 907–947.
Mahajan, V., E. Muller, S. Sharma. 1984. An empirical comparison of awareness forecasting models of new
product introduction. Marketing Sci. 3(3) 179–197.
McCarthy, A.M., D.A. Krueger, T.S. Schoenecker. 1990. Changes in the time allocation patterns of
entrepreneurs Entrepreneurship Theory and Prac. 15(2) 7–18.
McDonald, R., D. Siegel. 1986. The value of waiting to invest. Quart. J. Econ. 101(4) 707–727.
Mills, K. 2015. The 4 types of small businesses, and why each one matters. Retrieved April 30, 2015, from
https://hbr.org/2015/04/the-4-types-of-small-businesses-and-why-each-one-matters
Mueller, S., T. Volery, B. von Siemens. 2012. What do entrepreneurs actually do? An observational study
of entrepreneurs’ everyday behavior in the start-up and growth stages. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Prac. 36(5) 995–1017.
Orrbeck, M.G., D.R. Schueete, H.E. Thompson. 1968. The effect of worker productivity on production
smoothing. Management Sci. 14(6) 332–342.
Phillips, B.D., B.A. Kirchhoff. 1989. Formation, growth, and survival: Small firm dynamics in the U.S.
economy. Small Business Economics 1(1) 65–74.
Pindyck, R.S. 1988. Irreversible investment, capacity choice, and the value of the firm. Amer. Econom. Rev.
78(5) 969–985.
Pinker, E., R. Shumsky. 2000. The efficiency-quality tradeoff of crosstrained workers. Manufacturing Service
Oper. Management 2(1) 32–48.
Swinney, R., G. Cachon, S. Netessine. 2011. Capacity investment timing by start-ups and established firms
in new markets. Management Sci. 57(4) 763–777.
Tanrisever, F., S. Erzurumulu, N. Joglekar. 2012. Production, process improvement and the survival of debt
financed startup firms. Prod. Oper. Management 21(4) 637–652.
Author: The Time-Money Trade-Off for Entrepreneurs
20 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-13-215.R2
Tansky, J.W., R.L. Heneman. 2006. Human Resource Strategies for the High Growth Entrepreneurial Firm.
Information Age Publishing, Inc., Greenwich, CT.
Van Mieghem, J.A. 2003. Capacity management, investment, and hedging: Review and recent developments.
Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 5(4) 269–302.
Williamson, I.O. 2000. Employer legitimacy and recruitment success in small business. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Prac. 25(1) 27–42.
Yoo, O.S., C. Corbett, G. Roels. 2015. Optimal time allocation for process improvement for growth-focused
entrepreneurs. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management, Forthcoming.
